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L’histoire d’Hollywood est intrinsèquement liée à l’histoire du développement
technologique. Mais la révolution numérique a transformé l’industrie du film et de la
télévision d’une façon inédite jusqu’à présent. Les studios hollywoodiens ont été contraints
de répondre à l’incertitude - notamment en ce qui concerne leurs profits - créée par
l’apparition de l’internet et le succès des nouvelles plateformes numériques parmi la jeune
génération.
En conséquence, Hollywood est face à un dilemme fondé sur deux évolutions
fondamentales : d’un côté, l’émergence de nouvelles fenêtres de diffusion des produits
audiovisuels (à lier à la théorie de la « longue traîne »), de l’autre la constitution d’un
nouveau type de consommateur, connu comme la i-genération ou la net-génération. Ces
évolutions introduisent deux questions : quelles sont les nouvelles habitudes de
consommation qui définissent le profil de ce public émergeant ? Et en conséquence, quel
modèle d’affaires dominera ce scénario numérique ?
Cet article tente de répondre à ces deux questions en dépeignant le cadre des
bouleversements présents et passés auxquels fait face l’industrie du divertissement. Dans
un premier temps, j’examinerai les traits dominants du consommateur émergeant et les
éléments les plus significatifs de l’économie numérique au regard du modèle de la « longue
traîne ». Dans un second temps, je décrirai les réactions d’Hollywood à ce nouveau scénario
numérique et les nouveaux modèles d’affaires adoptés par les grands studios hollywoodiens
relatifs aux téléchargements des films et des programmes de télévision. Enfin, je conclurai
par quelques remarques destinées à tracer le cadre mouvant de l’industrie du
divertissement et sa recherche de nouvelles stratégies de rentabilité.
The history of Hollywood runs in tandem with the history of technological development.
However, the digital revolution has transformed the film and TV industry in ways never
foreseen. Hollywood studios have been forced to respond to the uncertainty – and potential
for profit – prompted by the popularity of the internet and the success of new digital
platforms, especially among young people. 
Thus, Hollywood is standing at a new crossroads, charted by two basic movements: on the
one hand, the emergence of new windows for the exploitation of audiovisual products
(linked to “long tail” markets; on the other, the consolidation of new type of consumer,
known collectively as the i-generation or net-generation. The two related questions in this
regard are: What new consumer habits define this emerging viewer/audience profile? As a
consequence, what business model will rule this new digital scenario? 
This article tries to respond to both questions, tracing the framework of present and future
challenges facing the entertainment industry. First, I will examine the defining features of
the emerging consumer profile and address the most significant elements of the new
digital economy, epitomized by the ‘long tail market’ model. Secondly, I will describe the
Hollywood reaction to this new digital scenario and discuss the business models adopted by
major American studios in relation to the downloading of films and TV programs. Finally, I
will make some concluding remarks to reframe the changing face of the entertainment
industry and the search for the right business strategies.
Index  terms
Mots-­clés  : distribution online, Hollywood, modèles d’affaires, théorie de la longue traîne
Keywords  : business models, Hollywood, Long Tail Theory, online distribution
Full  text
Being  or  Not  Being  Digital
In the mid-1990s, Nicholas Negroponte announced in his famous book Being
Digital: “I am convinced that by the year 2005 Americans will spend more hours on
the Internet (or whatever it is called) than watching network television”
(Negroponte, 1995: p. 98). Although this prediction has not yet been fulfilled to the
letter, the truth of what he argued is likely to be confirmed in the near future.
Effectively, as Newsweek graphically illustrated in July 2010, under the provocative
title “How the Digital Revolution Changed Our World”, time spent on the Internet by
the average US citizen has grown from 2.7 hours per week to 18 hours in the last
decade. And the amount of downloads for entertainment content on iTunes
surpasses 10 billion (Newsweek, 2010).
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Something is changing in our planet. To get a glimpse of it, let’s take a look at the
rapid expansion of the “Apple ecosystem”. Since 2001, Steve Jobs’ company has sold
more than 140 million iPods ⎯which amount to more than 30% of the company’s
annual income. In addition, the success of the iPhone has no precedent. The
company forecast the figure of 100 million iPhones in the whole world for 2011. The
recent launch of the iPad has surpassed all expectations (15 million sold in the first
year). As a result, following the market-launch of the iTunes Music Store, the Apple
brand has commercialized more than 4 billion songs, more than 3 million feature
films, and approximately 100 million TV programs and series since October 2005.
In 2010, Apple accounted for 48.8% of all online movie revenues outside the US
(McBride, 2006; Fritz, 2007; Screen  Digest, 2007, 2011; Grover, 2008; Hesseldahl,
2008a, 2008b). This iPod/iPad generation epitomizes the new profile of users
whose audiovisual experience is based on all sorts of media platforms and whose
profile mirrors to a large extent that of the cinema-going public and of those who
play videogames. For that reason, Apple competitors (Microsoft, Samsung, Google,
etc.) are trying to catch up the train of present-and-future technology.
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How will such a revolution affect the movie business? According to some recent
market indicators, there is no reason to be worried. According to Screen   Digest,
consumer expenses on online movies and TV series in the USA doubled (from 200 to
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New  Consumers  for  New  Markets
It is the sexier big sister of the more prosaic term ICE (information,
communication and entertainment) coined in India during the dotcom
boom to denote a marriage of information technology and entertainment.
And to an extent, both dreams have come true. It is barely impossible to
walk 100m in a city in any developed country without seeing the distinctive
white earphones of an iPod. Mobile gaming is expanding quickly and
telephones have lost their dowdy role as a means of speaking to people, to
become portable electronic leisure centers (Gubbins, 2008).
400 million US dollars) between 2008 and 2010—making rental returns more solid
than retail. Similarly, revenues from the Western European online movie market
were worth 50 million euros in the first half of 2010, twice the amount made in 2009
(Screen   Digest, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). Finally, the total online revenues for
international territories (outside the US) increased to more than 276 million US
dollars in 2010, a 117.5% rise over 2009 (Screen  Digest, 2011).
Hollywood is thus standing at a new digital (and global) crossroads, charted by
two basic movements: on one hand, the emergence of a new market for the
commercialization of audiovisual products (Internet, IPTV, digital reproduction
devices, mobile telephones), referred to as the long tail market; and, on the other
hand, the emergence of a new type of consumers, known collectively as the iPod or
Net-generation (Taspscott, 2009). The two questions set out below sum up the
challenges facing the major studios in Hollywood: What are the new consumer
habits that define this emerging viewer/audience profile? As a consequence, what
business model will define the network of relations on the Internet in regard to the
commercial practices of the film and TV series industry? In other words, what are the
rules governing this new market?
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Marketing experts are convinced that this generation of new technology users has
now reached a critical mass in numerical terms, and that their consumer behavior is
markedly different. The following aspects of new consumer behaviors might be
highlighted: a) a more participative and active attitude with respect to audiovisual
and entertainment contents (user-generated contents); b) multi-tasking skills; c)
new forms of socializing through virtual communities; d) a preference for versatility
and portability over quality in consumer use –“platform agnostics”, in the words of
David Denby, the renowned film critic at The  New  Yorker (Denby, 2006); e) new
consumer behavior as a catalyst for the creation of new market niches (low demand,
personalized and individually tailored consumption); and f) unconventional
understandings of the free circulation of audiovisual material (piracy).
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This matrix of aspects has been distilled into the well-known slogan taken as the
motto for the new media scene: “What you want, when you want, where you want
and how you want”. As Michael Gubbins ⎯editor of Screen   Daily⎯ calls it,
remembering an iconic advertisement of the 1970s, this is the ultimate expression of
‘the Martini culture’ in our “ubiquitous leisure society”. In regard to this term, he
explains:
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The following question inevitably arises in this context: What rules govern
business in this new world of commercial opportunities? Chris Anderson, editor of
Wired, christened this recently discovered “gold mine” with the name ‘the long tail’,
a term that has since become common currency (Anderson, 2004, 2006). His
argument, which soon drew on empirical evidence from an analysis of several
companies in the sector, runs as follows: commercialization on the Internet is not a
marginal market; rather, it is an emerging market whose value constantly increases.
This argument for Internet commercialization differs for three reasons: a) the
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It is therefore highly disputable that much money can be made in the tail.
In sales of both videos and recorded music –in many ways the perfect
products to test the long-tail theory– we see that hits are and probably will
remain dominant. That is the reality that should inform retailers as they
struggle to offer their customers a satisfying assortment cost-efficiently. And
it’s the unavoidable challenge to producers. The companies that will prosper
are the ones most capable of capitalizing on individual best sellers (Elberse,
2008: p. 96).
Internet brings together a dispersed and fragmented audience which, as a whole,
constitutes a significant market; b) distribution costs are eliminated and product
consumption becomes more personalized and attuned to the demands of these
‘digital natives’; and c) popularity is no longer the key factor in market value; in fact,
the Internet is especially apt (and profitable) for the sale of relatively unknown or
minority interest products (Anderson, 2004: p. 174-177).
Thus, the emergence of this new virtual market undermines one of the classical
laws of consumer goods economics—20% of products account for 80% of sales (the
Pareto principle). Having analyzed the online services of companies such as
Amazon, Netflix and Wal-Mart, Anderson concludes that the proportion of products
that contribute to overall profitability in virtual markets might be as high as 98%.
This conclusion does not mean that the most successful titles in conventional
distribution channels cease to be so in the virtual world; however, less well-known
or minority interest products also become more easily available and are acquired by
the fragmented audience(s) of which the virtual market is composed. As a result, a
specific catalogue of audiovisual goods may repay on the outlay involved in their
production, and profit margins may rise.
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Finally, Anderson outlines three rules to govern this new business model, entirely
focused on the leading role and singularity of the consumer: 1) availability of a wide
range of titles (“make everything available”); 2) competitive pricing in comparison to
other distribution channels (“cut the price in half; now lower it”); and 3)
personalized consumption (“help me find…”) (ibid.: 174-177). And he concludes:
“The companies that will prosper will be those that switch out of lowest-common-
denominator mode and figure out how to address niches” (ibid: 177).
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However, this theory has been criticized by some well-known scholars. Founding
her reflection on her own empirical research, Anita Elberse (Harvard Business
School) states that the tail may be long but is equally flat in terms of benefits. In
addition, she affirms that compared with heavy users, light users have a
disproportionately strong preference for the more popular offerings, while both
groups appreciate hit products more than they like those in the tail. As she
concludes:
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In my view, both interpretations can be compatible. On the one hand, it is clear
that Internet has widened the commercial exploitation for all sorts of products and,
therefore, has given opportunity to those considered “marginal” or “obscure”—with
no chance of commercial exposure through the conventional windows. On the other
hand, hits will always be hits. They will continue to act as the locomotive for
entertainment consumption and will therefore remain as the hard core of the
business.
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In this regard, after a few false starts, a number of the changes to business
strategies adopted by Hollywood studios in recent times have attempted to take the
above-mentioned principles into account. For any key player in the entertainment
industry aimed at a ubiquitous leisure society, the challenge is to understand this
new scenario, where the ‘Martini culture’ meets the ‘long tail’ markets.
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Hollywood  at  the  Digital  Crossroad:  A
Management  Clash?
How has Hollywood responded to the huge changes afoot? Unfortunately,
not very well so far. First, Hollywood has ignored the facts both inside and
outside the industry… [It] has fought to put the technological genie back in
the bottle. The Hollywood approach: change must be legislated or litigated to
a stop (Dekom & Sealey, 2003: p. 2-3).
Media companies need to learn to let go. Successful entertainment
companies will create new products and pricing schemes, embrace fair use
by giving customers flexibility in choosing how they want to view or listen to
a work, and give outside innovators the freedom to tinker with and improve
existing products. Media companies should embrace their digital destiny,
even as their business models suffer short-term dislocation (Lasica, 2005:
p. 265).
In the studios… you end up doing things that are slow and incredibly safe…
In order to move quickly enough, you have to think like a startup and that
means you have to be a startup and run like a startup. The studios are
always going to be followers rather than leaders (in Rose, 2000).
The consortium of rich corporations that used to control this entire medium
are now doomed… In some ways we’re moving to a world without borders.
We are seeing a paradigm change in how movies get made, how they get
distributed, and the Internet has pretty much wiped out those borders. Now
you can get people around the world to see your film (in Screen Daily,
2010).
Contrary to what may be assumed, Hollywood has been quite reluctant to face up
these profound changes. Two insiders, Peter Dekom and Peter Sealy, asked in 2003:
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Another expert analyst, Joseph D. Lasica, pointed to this resistance from the
Hollywood majors, assessed in 2005:
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From inside Hollywood, oppositional voices can be heard. Although the majority
of studio executives assume the need for change, others despair of the slow rhythm of
the decision-making process within the huge and bureaucratic corporations. This is
the case, for example, of David Wertheimer, former Paramount Digital
Entertainment Head and current President at Digital Fox. Remembering his years
working for the former studio, he assesses:
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Why does this fear of change exist? Someone as significant as George Lucas
explained it in a very clear way:
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In other words, what is at stake is the current Hollywood status quo as unbeatable
oligopoly of production and distribution of branded entertainment contents.
Executives at the major studios acknowledge that the existing commercial models
are in terminal decline. Box-office takings in 2005 amounted to only 14.2% of total
income. The other 85.8% was generated through the sale of audiovisual products
designed for use at home and/or in an individualized way. In the last two decades,
the highest percentage of income has been raised by DVD sales and pay-per-view
television, but the digital revolution is also likely to radically transform the market in
this regard. The physical copy of the audiovisual product will disappear, and the
existing distribution channels along with it. Nevertheless, the industry response to
this prospect ought to be measured.
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Hollywood studio executives have now taken careful note of the rules detailed
above. Having been initially resistant if not openly hostile to the development of
television and video, and thus slow to adapt these new media to their existing
18
Hollywood is suspicious of technology. It always has been. But when it
comes to the World Wide Web, it turns out that Hollywood has actually
taken over the reigns of Internet entertainment—it just hasn’t done it the
way everyone thought it would (Graser, 2000: 22).
The commercial developments of new markets and technologies often take
place in a bifurcated fashion, particularly in oligopolies. Specifically, it is
possible to make a broad distinction between processes of exploration and
exploitation (Tushman & Anderson, 2004). First, the exploration of
business model, the response of such executives to the emergence of new
technologies has been markedly different. Nowadays, no one is reluctant. “We have
to adapt”, says Barry Meyer, Chairman and CEO of Warner Brothers Entertainment,
“or we’ll become dinosaurs” (Denby, 2006). However, prudence must rule the
progressive incorporation of new business models. As Bob Iger, CEO of The Walt
Disney Company and one of the most committed defenders of change in Hollywood,
explains: “I have tried to keep two obvious philosophies: first, that our current
business does not get in the way of adopting new technologies; and, second, that our
business belongs to these new platforms” (Swisher, 2010). In other words, the quid
of the question is how to incorporate new business models without killing the most
profitable window (DVD and home entertainment).
If the Hollywood reaction to the digital scenario shows anything, it is a sort of
management clash: the new and challenging versus the old and conservative; or, in
other terms, the ‘digital’ mentality versus the ‘analogical’ one. This is one of the
conclusions made by Andrew Currah (2006) after interviewing 150 Hollywood
members. He summarizes in detail three concluding remarks. First, Hollywood’s
strategy has been one of preserving the current sequence of commercial windows,
rather than exploiting the disruptive power of new technologies (protectionism born
of oligopoly). In his words, “this has been the case of the collision between
Hollywood (a mature oligopoly overseen by six studios) and the Internet (a
decentralized P2P [peer-to-peer] architecture)” (Currah, 2006: p. 463). Similarly,
Frank Rose, editor of Wire, pointed out at the turn of the century: “Hollywood exists
to feed the proven bottom line, not to invent the next one” (Rose, 2000).
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Secondly, we should also understand the main reasons argued by Hollywood
executives for their reluctance. On the one hand, the risk of DVD cannibalization—
killing the most profitable window—and the subsequent pressure exercised by big
retailers’ like Wal-Mart or Blockbuster (until recently, DVD sales accounted for 55%
of total income). Despite the fears and reluctances, there is no doubt that the future of
the Internet as window depends on Hollywood involvement (ibid.: p. 463). As
Variety stated at the beginning of this decade,
20
In summary, the new digital scenario demands a change of business and
management mentality: the old assumptions of limits on creation and access, typical
of an economy of content scarcity, must give way to the new value drivers of free
access, an almost infinite variety of products, customized consumption, content
aggregators and search engines, typical of an economy of abundance (although with
time and expense restrictions).
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The move from analogical to digital has been slow. At the beginning of the new
millennium, the alliance between Hollywood and Silicon Valley became more
intense. Technological companies were looking to create Hollywood relationships
and a number of industry players moved to ‘dot-com’ companies. Nevertheless,
“Hollywood’s new Web-friendly stance and new deals don’t necessarily mean that
Hollywood understands the ways of the Web” (Graser, 2000). In fact, these deals
were more a question of using the Internet as a testing laboratory for commercial
exploitation (Graser, 2000; DiOrio, 2000). This attitude towards new markets is
quite typical in the case of oligopolistic industries, as Currah explains:
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emerging markets tends to be pioneered by smaller firms, outside the orbit
of incumbent firms… Second, a tipping point occurs when emerging
markets obtain a critical mass, attracting the interest of incumbents. In a
few cases, this process of exploitation might lead to the displacement of
incumbents and the ascendance of innovative ‘first movers’… In most cases,
however, the growth of a new market actually depends upon incumbents
given their assets and market power. Generally innovators are more likely to
‘sell out’ rather than challenge the ruling oligopoly (Currah, 2006: p. 463).
Business  Models:  What  Did  Go
Wrong,  What  Should  Be  Right
Once upon a time… the movie business was about making movies.
Nowadays, it is about creating intellectual property that can be licensed in a
raft of different markets… The [Hollywood] studios stand to gain even more
from huge audiences willing to pay to download movies from their
libraries… [Therefore], the real issue for Hollywood studios is how they can
dig into this potential gold mine without undermining their existing
revenue streams (Epstein, 2005).
Advertising, development, syndication and subscription. The seeds have
been planted for profitability, but all these business plans are facing a dot-
comeuppance. The basic problem? Nobody can quantify or define the type
of content people are willing to pay for… Netizens are willing to pay for
content if they get something in return that facilitates their Internet
experience, and this realization is starting to dawn on traditional
entertainment outlets (Donahue, 2001: p. 18).
Effectively, the never-ending strategic movements of mergers, acquisitions and
alliances that have taken place along this decade exemplify this dynamic: Fox +
MySpace, Disney + Pixar + Apple, Blockbuster + MovieLink vs. Walt Mart + Netflix,
Google + You Tube vs. Hulu, Amazon-Unibox + TiVo, etc. These strategic initiatives
provide ample evidence of the determination of Hollywood studios not to miss the
boat on so-called gear-media. The alliance between Hollywood and Silicon Valley is
becoming tighter (Lawson, 2007).
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For the Hollywood studios ⎯as well as for the rest of the key players in the
entertainment industry⎯ the search for the right Internet business model has
become harder, but also as crucial as the quest for the Philosopher’s Stone. As one
industry expert states,
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Apparently, the theoretical principles have been always clear, but reality has
widely proven that this new market (or new consumer) has its own rules. Back in
2001, a Variety expert stated,
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As we have mentioned before, surprising though it may seem, the failure of the
first business model adopted by the Hollywood studios in response to the commercial
potential of new technologies—Cinema Now and MovieLink—was attributed to an
error at the level of first principles: if the Internet is to be a new entertainment
platform capable of competing with the conventional media (DVD rental and pay-
per-view TV), then either the audiovisual experience it offers should be more
attractive and user-friendly, thus selling at a correspondingly higher price, or its
products should be sold at prices considerably lower than those of the existing
media. With a wisdom based on common sense, Billboard analyst Michael Greeson
wrote an article prophetically entitled “Movie Downloads: Why This Model Won’t
Work”… (Greerson, 2006). Only the emergence of the iTunes model—first for music,
then for movies and TV episodes—marked a turning point (Pardo, 2009: p. 77-82).
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In any case, as a number of industry commentators have pointed out, the future of
the film download business model will be dependent on a hybrid financing structure,
involving a combination of direct (pay-per-view and subscription) and indirect
(advertising and sponsorship) funding (Fritz, 2007). The three current business
models to consolidate are: a) Transactional: consumers can buy a permanent
download (‘download-to-own’, DTO), rent a temporary download or buy temporary
access to a stream (VoD rental); b) Subscription: consumers can subscribe to an ‘all-
you-can-eat’ rental service offering temporary downloads or streams in return for a
single monthly fee (SVoD); and c) Ad-­supported: consumers can download or
stream titles for free in return for watching video ads within the content (FVoD)
(Screen  Digest, 2007: p. 270-271).
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In fact, it seems that Hollywood has finally learnt the lesson. At the 2010
Consumer Electronics Show at Las Vegas, a consortium of the major Hollywood
studios, retailers, cable operators, hardware manufacturers and rental services (with
the exception of Disney and Apple) known as Digital Entertainment Content
Ecosystem (DECE), announced the launching of UltraViolet, an online content
locker that stores and plays movies and TV shows on a variety of devices.1 This
platform enables consumers to purchase a film from any provider and store it online
in order to view it using any device with an Internet connection—computers, TVs,
cable set-top boxes, Blu-ray players, videogame consoles, smartphones and tablets.
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The most significant change is that this new online device really meets the
consumption habits and demands of the ‘digital natives’. Every single household can
create an account for six family members to access their movies and TV shows, and
later music, books and other digital contents, from retailers, cable operators and
streaming services. Up to 12 different devices can be registered—to cover most of the
hardware options on the market—, being possible up to three streams at a single
time. In addition, content can be downloaded and transferred onto physical media,
like recordable DVDs, SD cards and flash memory drives.
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“We’ve tried to emulate consistent consumer behavior [in developing this service]”,
says Mitch Singer, DECE president and chief technology officer of Sony Pictures
Entertainment. “What we found was that consumers were getting contents from the
Internet for free and burning DVDs for friends or playing them across every device.
We looked at what consumers are currently doing and gave them that with
UltraViolet” (Graser, 2011). For his part, Thomas Gewecke, president of Warner
Brothers Digital Distribution confirms: “We believe that UltraViolet will provide
consumers with an easy-to-use way to buy and watch digital entertainment across
multiple devices”. And he adds: “Making interoperability possible meets a key
consumer need and fundamentally improves the digital video experience. With
UltraViolet, consumers will be able to purchase a title once and enjoy it anywhere
and anytime they wish” (Graser, 2010). With Hollywood looking for a bright light to
reverse a dark downturn in home-video sales over the last several years, the
UltraViolet name couldn’t be more fitting.
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Meanwhile, Disney—the only self-excluded studio in this venture—has recently
announced a new rental deal with YouTube. The Google-owned video online
platform will offer Disney films for rental on its website, ranging from 1 to 4 US
dollars depending on whether they are library titles or releases timed with the home-
video window. This rental deal is just one step forward in the increasing cooperation
between the two companies, whose strategic plans include a co-branded channel
with original programming that would reside both on YouTube and Disney.com
(Wallestein, 2011).
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As can be noticed, the studios are still taking positions on the digital game board,
but no one exactly knows which rules will actually be applied and who will finally
succeed in offering the golden formula to win the consumer’s confidence.
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The  Future  is  Now:  Movie  Business
in  Digital  Hollywood
Conclusion:  From  Reluctance  to
Prudent  Embrace
In order to summarize some of the most significant transformations Hollywood is
undergoing to adapt to this new digital scenario, we should mention the following:
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1. Customized   consumption: As explained before, the new generation of
consumers (‘digital natives’) demands a personalized way to enjoy online
entertainment content—music, movies, TV series, videogames—which means
complete freedom of choice, flexibility and portability. This ‘Martini Culture’
meeting the ‘long tail’ market requires the right targeting, pricing and
technological infrastructure (broadband) strategies. Initiatives like
UltraViolet show a change of mentality on the part of the Hollywood studios,
in their effort to accommodate these new consumption habits.
2. Redefining   the   window   sequence: This profound transformation in
consuming entertainment—consumers’ new habits and disappearance of the
physical copy—is definitely changing the current sequence of commercial
windows. On the one hand, the time period of exclusivity is narrowing in
order to avoid market competition and piracy effects; on the other, customized
consumption obliges simultaneous release—product availability in several
windows at the same time with price discrimination (Ulin, 2009: p. 33-36).
As a consequence, the distribution sector as we know it is condemned to
disappear or to be dramatically transformed—into online content aggregators,
for instance. Physical copies will soon disappear, and ‘virtual markets’ will
end up as the preferred option—as the iCloud option recently announced by
Apple (Morris, 2011).
3. Content   is  still  king  but   it  needs  adaptation: Despite recent advances in
technology, creativity is still the cornerstone of the audiovisual industry. No
matter how fast technology is evolving or how dramatically distribution is
changing, “if you have a great story to tell, it will work on any delivery
system”, affirmed Michael Eisner a few years ago (quoted in Tartaglione-
Vialatte, 2008). Nevertheless, this new market physionomy is leading to a
polarization of entertainment content: on the one hand, the big-budgeted
Hollywood blockbusters, with high production values, especially design for a
3D cinema experience; on the other hand, the small and target-specific niche
films, aimed directly at home entertainment. This polarization also justifies
the need to create franchises and brand-entertainment contents in order to
feed a regular market (Ulin, 2009: p. 18-29). Finally, fiction and
entertainment contents must be developed from their earliest stages for
multimedia and interactive consumption. From this perspective, the keys to
develop successful content are related to the capacity for multiplatform
distribution and consumer customization—i. e., interactive options, potential
to create a prestigious brand and capacity to tell an original ‘transmedia’ story
(Jenkins, 2006).
‘Convergence’ is a fashionable word in this new environment (Jenkins, 2006;
Pavlik & McIntosh, 2011). The Hollywood executives are facing the most
challenging transformation in the whole history of the entertainment industry. The
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digital revolution is shaking the traditional-conservative business models
(analogical) and new (online) options are emerging with unavoidable impetus. The
discussion is open: access vs. content, franchises over distribution channel, free vs.
pay/premium content (or a mixed model), user-generated-content vs. professional
work, etc.
The previous pages show how Hollywood has progressively moved from a
reluctant attitude to a prudent embrace of new technologies. At the present moment,
there is some noticeable evidence. Firstly, the consolidation of an emerging market—
consumer expense on online movies & TV series has doubled in the last year both in
the USA and in Western Europe, and it is steadily increasing throughout the world
(Screen   Digest, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011). Secondly, the search for the right
business model is still a pending issue—hybrid models, including transactions,
subscription or ad-supported formulas; all of them offering a good price-quality
relation. In the third place, new products are needed for new consumers—more
innovative and participative forms of audiovisual entertainment, expressed in
multiplatform products. And finally, the entry of new players and new forms of
synergies and competition—Hollywood alliances with Google-You Tube, Hulu,
Apple TV, TiVo, etc.; the transformation of distributors into search engines or
content aggregators; of retailers into ‘e-tailers’ (Netflix, Blockbuster, Amazon or
Wal-Mart) and even beyond—into pay TV channels, like Netflix.
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At the same time, uncertainties remain. As said before, Hollywood studios are
willing to embrace new technologies but without ‘cannibalizing’ their most
profitable windows to date (cable TV and DVD). There is no evidence that
cannibalization always exists. When Iron   Man became available on iTunes in
September 2008, for instance, it sold more than 1 million US$ in 2.99 US$
downloads in its first seven days of release—almost pure profit, because of its low
cost of delivery. Nevertheless when the same movie was released in DVD, it achieved
the 140 million US$ revenue figure in its first week (Barnes, 2008).
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Hollywood studios won’t abandon their reluctance to license their contents to
online services in the short term. As chief content providers, they own the key to
digital changes. Recent ups-and-downs of successful online platforms like Netflix
and Hulu, together with their strategic moves, show to what extent contents are still
crucial (Goldsmith, 2011; Wallestein, 2011b). In this regard, I would like to conclude
by paraphrasing Screen  Digest.
37
If the movie industry is to build an online business, major content owners must
emulate their counterparts in TV by loosening their grip on content and
experimenting with services and business models. Until they do, online services will
continue to represent a nominal revenue stream for the movie business (Screen
Digest, 2010b).
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1 DECE is made up of 60 members, which covers most major entertainment suppliers and
device manufacturers. Founding members include Best Buy, Netflix, Comcast, Cox
Communications, BSkyB, Intel, Microsoft, Cisco, Dell, IBM, HP, Toshiba, Samsung, LG,
Nokia, Motorola, Dolby, Adobe and Sonic Solutions. While Fox, Warner Bros., Paramount,
Lionsgate and NBC Universal are supporters, Disney is focusing on its similar Disney
Studio All Access offering. Apple is also holding out from joining the organization, although
it’s likely that DECE’s companies will create apps that will play UltraViolet content on
devices like the iPod, iPhone and iPad (Graser, 2011).
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